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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
~VALTER H. RUF, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
~SSOCIATION FOR WORLD TRAV-
EL EXCHANGE and JAMES F. 
KENNY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9114 
The facts of this case are not complicated. 
The only question for consideration is whether the 
vidence supports the verdict as to the extent of damages. 
~he defendants, driving North on 4th East Street, ran 
hrough a stop sign and hit the automobile of the plaintiff 
roadside (R. 50, 62, 63, 108). The plaintiff's automobile 
ras thrown a distance of about 34 feet by the impact (R. 
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60) . The plaintiff was thrown from the automobile, lanj 
ing on his back (R. 71-72). 
No error has been assigned by the defendants relatiiJ 
to the issue of liability. The alleged error goes solely to tl 
issue of damages. 
Although the nature and extent of the damages a1 
shown in detail in the transcript, they can be summarize 
briefly. Prior to the accident, plaintiff was in good healt 
(R. 79). He had no pain or disability (R. 79, 80). Hew~ 
an experienced typewriter and office equipment salesma 
(R. 78, 80). Plaintiff has continued to suffer pain an 
disability from the time of the accident (R. 74-80). Plair 
tiff is required to wear a steel back brace (R. 74-75). H 
is unable to perform his work as a typewriter and offic 
equipment salesman ( R. 77-78) . After treatment for se\ 
eral months, his doctor, Dr. William S. Allred, prescribe 
a spinal fusion operation (R. 142). This operation woul, 
result in the fusion of two vertebrae, causing a limitatio 
of motion but relieving pain (R. 142). Dr. Allred believe 
that a spinal fusion operation would result in improvemeiJ 
to plaintiff's back (R. 142). Plaintiff's earnings prior t 
the accident were between $450.00 and $500.00 per mont: 
(R. 82, 83, 84). Plaintiff's earnings dropped each mont: 
after the accident (R. 85). His earnings in October, 195 
were $319.05 (R. 86). In February, 1959 he earned $220.0 
(R. 86). From the end of February through April, he mad 
approximately $150.00 (R. 86). 
The jury verdict was in the amount of $1,344.57 speci~ 
damages and $20,000.00 general damages. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE; SAID 
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 9. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS ON DAMAGES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE; SAID 
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Defendants' recital of the facts is fragmentary; it 
:ails to give the Court a true and complete understanding 
>f the substantial evidence which supports the verdict. 
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Evidently the defendants' argument is that the plaii 
tiff sustained no injury as a result of the accident. On pag 
10 of the defendants' brief, the statement is made: "Ac 
mittedly, the man required a spinal fusion operation t 
repair the degenerative disease that pre-dated the accideiJ 
and which was in no way related to the accident by causG 
tion or aggravation." 
The italicized statement is contrary to the evidencE 
The plaintiff testified that he had had good health prio 
to the accident (R. 79). The only trouble that he had h3i 
was a minor back ailment in April, 1953 (R. 79). This ail 
ment was· corrected and never bothered him (R. 79). PlaiiJ 
tiff had sustained no injuries in his lifetime (R. 79). H 
had never been in another accident (R. 80). He had neve 
been hospitalized before the accident (R. 80). Immediatel 
prior to the accident, plaintiff was active and energetic (R 
98, 102, 124) and engaged in gainful employment for th 
Schreyer Typewriter Company (R. 80). Plaintiff testifiet 
that following the accident, he had constant pain and ten 
derness in his back (R. 72, 73, 74, 75). This evidence i 
undisputed. 
The witnesses, Evelyn Maria Ruf Smith, Franz Schreyer 
John Ashworth Thompson, and Margie Vivian Angell al 
testified that plaintiff appeared in good physical conditioJ 
prior to the time of the accident and did not manifest an: 
pain or difficulty in performing his livelihood (R. 98, 100 
102, 124, 153, 154). The witnesses, Evelyn Maria Ru 
Smith, Margie Vivian Angell, and Franz Schreyer testifie 
that after the accident plaintiff appeared unable to perforn 
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the usual functions without difficulty (R. 97-99, 100-103, 
124, 125). This evidence is undisputed. 
Dr. William S. Allred examined the plaintiff after the 
accident and on numerous other occasions and treated plain-
tiff during the period prior to the trial (R. 139-147). Dr. 
Allred is an orthopedic specialist (R. 137). Dr. Allred tes-
tified that the accident of September 5, 1958 precipitated 
the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains (R. 143). 
Dr. Allred testified that it was not uncommon for persons 
to have a narrowing of an intervertebral space without ex-
periencing pain (R. 143, 151). Dr. Allred testified that the 
plaintiff was, in his opinion, unable to continue carrying 
typewriters or other heavy equipment (R. 147). Dr. Allred 
recommended a spinal fusion operation (R. 142). The 
Doctor felt that with a spinal fusion operation, plaintiff 
could expect some improvement in the condition of his back 
(R. 142). However, the Doctor observed that the spinal 
fusion operation would result in some limitation of motion 
due to the fusion of vertebrae (R. 142). 
Defendants' witness, Dr. Paul Milligan, admitted on 
cross-examination that he had found limitation of motion 
which was visible in his examination of plaintiff's back 
(R. 169); that a violent throw from an automobile with 
a man landing on his back could, and in fact did, cause some 
disintegration of the intervertebral disc (R. 171). Dr. 
Milligan also testified that he had every reason to believe 
what plaintiff had told him with respect to having pain in 
his back (R. 171). Dr. Milligan admitted that the accident 
was, or might have been, the precipitating cause of the 
symptoms of which plaintiff complains (R. 173). There .. 
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fore, both n1edical witnesses testified, in substance and 
effect, that the accident was probably the precipitating 
cause of plaintiff's disability, pain and suffering. 
No contention is made by the plaintiff that he is en-
titled to recover for a pre-existing physical condition. How-
ever, plaintiff is entitled to recover for the aggravation, 
resulting in disability, pain and suffering, of a condition 
which caused no disability or pain prior to the accident. 
The evidence in this case supports the finding, or for that 
matter establishes without dispute, that plaintiff's dis-
ability, pain and suffering were caused or precipitated by 
the negligence of the defendants. 
Furthermore, the evidence supports the finding by the 
jury as to the extent of the damages. Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover for any and all damages proximately resulting 
from the defendants' negligence, including pain and suffer-
ing, past and future, loss of earnings, and other elements, 
as specifically set forth in the Court's Instruction No. 8 to 
the jury. The jury was instructed that it could not specu-
late as to the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries, and 
should compensate plaintiff only for those injuries which 
it found from a preponderance of the evidence were di-
rectly and proximately a result of the accident. It must be 
assumed that the jury read, understood and followed the 
instructions. 
The evidence establishes that the plaintiff was, prior 
to the accident, able to perform the work of a typewriter 
and office equipment salesman (R. 79); that the plaintiff 
was capable of earning, and had earned between $450.00 
and $500.00 per month in the said line of work (R. 82, 83, 
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84) . The evidence shows that the· plaintiff was not able 
to perform the duties of an office equipment and typewriter 
salesman after the accident (R. 77, 98, 103, 125, 142). 
Plaintiff's earnings after the accident did not exceed 
$319.05 per month (R. 86). Plaintiff was fifty-four years 
of age at the time of the accident (R. 66). The medical 
witnesses, as well as the plaintiff, confirmed the fact that 
plaintiff suffered pain after the accident (R. 142, 171). 
The effect of a spinal fusion operation would be to fuse the 
vertebrae, causing a permanent limitation of motion in the 
lower back (R. 142). 
In summary, there was substantial evidence from which 
the jury could find damages in an amount equal to or in 
excess of the verdict. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendants treat Points I and II together for pur-
poses of argument. The statement is made that they relate 
to the same propositions. It is evident that there is no basis 
set forth in the defendants' brief or otherwise for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Al-
though a verdict which is unsupported by the evidence, or 
a verdict resulting from passion and prejudice of the jury 
might entitle a party to a new trial, there is no showing in 
this case either that the verdict is unsupported by the evi-
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dence or that the verdict was a result of passion and preju-
dice. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 9. 
Defendants contend that Instruction No. 9 is erroneQus 
in that it permits the jury to speculate as to the loss of earn-
ing capacity of the plaintiff. Defendants state that there 
is no evidence, documentary or otherwise, concerning plain-
tiff's life expectancy or for the period in which he might 
be gainfully employed. A reading of the entire context of 
Instruction No. 9, as well as other instructions given to the 
jury, will satisfy the Court that the jury was not permitted 
to speculate. Subsections 2 and 3 of Instruction No. 9 are 
as follows: 
"2. If the impairment of earning is not perma-
nent, then the computation of damage must be based 
only on the period for which the temporary loss of 
capacity is reasonably certain to continue. 
"3. If the impairment of earning capacity is 
permanent, then the period for computation of loss 
would be the time that it could reasonably be antici-
pated plaintiff would be gainfully employed, which 
might but may not necessarily be for the plaintiff's 
full life expectancy." 
In addition thereto, Instruction No. 10 charged the 
jury as follows: 
"You are further instructed that plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover for any claimed injury or damage 
which is of uncertain, speculative, or doubtful na· 
ture. Therefore, if the plaintiff shall have failed tc 
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prove any claimed injury or any claimed element of 
damage by a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
the evidence respecting any such matters is evenly 
balanced, you must resolve such issue in favor of the 
defendant. 
"You are not allowed and must not speculate as 
to the extent and nature of the plaintiff's injuries, 
but if you find he· is entitled to damages, he should 
be compensated only for those injuries which you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence were di-
rectly and proximately a result of the accident com-
plained of. A party is. not entitled to recover for 
imaginary injuries or injuries of a type or nature 
that are not a result of the accident or injury com-
plained of." 
The jury was not required to find a permanent impair-
ment of earning capacity. It was. charged on what it should 
do in the event that it determined from the evidence that 
such impairment of earning capacity was permanent. The 
jury was further charged that if the impairment of earn-
ings was not permanent, then the computation of damages 
must be based only on the period for which the temporary 
loss of capacity was reasonably certain to continue. In In-
struction No. 10, the jury was expressly charged to the 
effect that it could not speculate as to the damages nor take 
into account injuries of an uncertain or doubtful nature. 
Defendants suggest that there is no documentary or 
other evidence concerning plaintiff's life expectancy or 
work expectancy. The only evidence which might properly 
have been received, which was not received on the issue of 
life expectancy, would be the mortality or life expectancy 
tables. Plaintiff is aware of no rule which prevents the 
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jury from determining from the evidence and in its own 
sound discretion, the elements of damage in the absence of 
life expectancy tables. In the last analysis, the question of 
life expectancy and the period for which a plaintiff might 
be gainfully employed, is within the sound judgment of the 
jury, based upon the evidence in the case. If, as the defen-
dants suggest, the jury was permitted to speculate with 
respect to life expectancy and period of gainful employ-
ment, then such is the case in every trial wherein life ex-
pectancy and work expectancy data is not introduced. 
The fact is that plaintiff endeavored to have the jury 
charged with respect to the life expectancy of the plaintiff, 
but such instruction was not given. 
There is no serious doubt but what there is evidence 
from which the jury could find that plaintiff sustained 
permanent impairment of earnings and earning capacity. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS ON DAMAGES. 
There is no merit whatsoever to the contention by de-
fendants that the Court's, instructions on damages were 
unbalanced in favor of the plaintiff and against the defen-
dants. 
Defendants state that the Court's instructions on the 
question of damages were contained in Instructions Nos. 8, 
9, 10 and 13. This is incorrect. In addition to the Instruc-
tions Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 13, relating to damages, the matter 
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of damages was covered in Instructions Nos. 11 and 12. In-
struction No. 11 was in conformity with Defendants' Re-
quested Instruction No. 11. Instruction No. 12 was for the 
benefit of the defendants and in conformity with Defen-
dants' Requested Instruction No. 14. Instruction No. 8 is 
a general instruction on the question of damages, generally 
recognized as being a correct and fair instruction as to the 
law applicable to the issue of damages. There is certainly 
no charge made in the said instruction which contains an 
incorrect statement of the law. Instruction No. 9 deals 
specifically with the question of impairm·ent of earning ca-
pacity. Said instruction contains a correct statement of the 
law. Plaintiff submits that the instruction was as beneficial 
to the defendants as to the plaintiff. Particularly, subpara-
graph 2 of the said instruction charged the jury on one 
aspect of the defendants' theory of the case. Instruction No. 
10 is, in its entirety, Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 
13. 
The first paragraph of Instruction No. 13 is practically 
identical with the provisions of Defendants' Requested In-
struction No. 12. The last paragraph of Instruction No. 13, 
although not requested by defendants, correctly states the 
law. 
It is significant that no exception was taken by defen-
dants to the Court's instructions, nor to the failure to give 
Requested Instructions, except with respect to the giving 
of Instruction No. 9. 
Defendants can show no prejudice resulting to then1 
from the instructions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the only real 
question to be considered by the Court on this appeal is 
whether there is ample evidence to support the verdict and 
judgment. The record shows the evidence to be ample. 
There is no showing of any passion or prejudice on the 
part of the jury. The Court is called upon by the Appellant 
to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. This, the 
Court cannot and should not do. The judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
OORNW ALL & McCARTHY, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Reed A. Watkins, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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